' · PHILOSOPHICAL TRENDS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA THOMAS A. GauncE THE nineteenth century was largely a formative period in American philosophy. Historical circumstances were unfavourable to the development of indigenous systems of thought~ and philosophical conceptions· nearly all ,came from Europe. What happened to these conceptions after crossing the Atlantic is a story that deserves to be better known than it is. Not only does it possess intrinsic. interest as a chapter in the history of ideas, but it also helps to illuminate the dQctrines expounded later by such "typically American" philosophers as Peirce, James, and Dewey. Mor~ over, 1t serves to cast a significant light on certain aspects of American civilization which emerged during the century. My purpose in the present paper is to relate this story in its broadest outlines.
It is reasonably accurate to say that the philosophical .trends of the period were four in number. Until the middle of the century, T-ranscendentalism was the dominant mode of thought outside academic circles, while the Scottish philosophy of Common Sense prevailed within the universities. After 1860, the mantle. of the Transcendentalists fell on the St. Louis Hegelians, that re·markable group of enthusiasts for classical Germ~n philosophy which was formed in the Middle West. The last thirty years of the century witnessed the arrival of Evolutionism in both the Darwinian and Spencerian versions. Its impact soon swept away the Scottish doctrines, and left a permanent effect on the intellectu.allife of the country.
I
Transcendentalism was the form which philosophical romanticism first took in America. It has been characterized as a· n inheritance from Kant admixed with elements from the systems of Fichte and Schelling. 1 This was, indeed, its primary source. But in the case of such a major representative of the movement as Emerson, the influence of Platonism was also paramount. Both these sources were superimposed on the native moral earnestness which was carried over from the Puritan tradition. One might · say, therefore, that Transc~ndentalism was an amalgam of Platonism, Puritanism,· and German romanticism, with the third of these as the most important. tarian clergymen who sought a more adequate formulation for their theology. They felt that the pallid negativism into which their faith had fallen was doubly ineffectual. On the one hand, it ma~e little progress in the struggle against rationalistic materiali~m which portrayed the individual as a mere puppet of natural laws, and reduced his consciousness to a byproduct of physical forces. On the other hand, it was out of harmony with the new spiri f of the times. This was the period when American society was changing from an agrarian and commercial economy to an industria] one. Vast natural resources were beginning to be exploited by men-of energy. and initiative. The age of Jackson had gi. ven fresh content to notions of political democracy. If Unitarianism was to be a vit~l factor in the community, it required a philosophy that would express the dominant motifs involved in these changes. That is to say, it needed a philosophy which was both idealistic and individualistic.
Transcendentalism proved to be the answer to this need. By accepting Coleridge's distinction between. understanding and reason-the former yielding scientific kpowledge, the latter yielding that deeper revelation of feeling which is wisdom-the basis was provided for a philosophical id~alism. Hence, in place of the doctrine that intellect is the sole source of truth, the Transcendentalists_ affirmed the primacy of feeling and intuition. The pronouncements of the heart are always to be preferred to . those of the head. In opposition to determinism, they defended the doctrine of free will. Man has a dire~t awareness of his freedom to act. In contrast to the view that consciousness is a mere epiphenomenon, they stressed the active, creative role of mind in the world. As Emerson put it in his lecture on "The Transcendentalist": "The materialist insists on facts, on history, on the force of circumstances and the animal wants of man; the idealist on the power of Thought and Will, on· inspiration, on miracle, on individual culture." 3 From this it was but a step to the exalting of "self-reliance" as an important ·moral value. Thus the note of individualism was sounded. The releasing of man 1 S creative potentialities required that he should be freed from the limitations of a mechanistic philosophy, and be given a '-Journal; (London, 1913) , VIII, 225. 3 Works (London, 1903-21), I, 329-30. faith which would encourage him to develop the richness of his inner life.
Another facet of Transcendentalism was its opposition to doctrines which separated man from nature, and regarded natural phenomena as inimical to the concerns of the soul. On this point it was thoroughly monistic. Just as Kant had argued that the empirical world is really the product of the mind's -activity; so the Transcendentalists declared nature to be the embodiment of spirit in the world of sense. -Their affirmations usua1ly took the form of pantheism. Nature is an incarnation of God. The Divine Essence is at work in all things. It expresses itself objectively_ in the language of physical events, subjectively in the language of human . feelings, intuitions, and thoughts. Such ari attempt to interpret nature in terms of mind is a typical feature of philosophical romanticism. The · Transcendentalists adopted it as a basis for establishing the harmony of the inner and the outer worlds. It is interesting that while these doctrines were being preached, contemporary economic developments were giving a concrete demonstration that nature, so far from being h-ostile to man, is highly amenable to his will. :Pantheism predisposes its adherents to take an optimistic view of life. Since God is everywhere, all that happens is in accordance with the Divine Nature, and must therefore be_ good. Without worrying about the metaphysical difficulties involved, the Transcendentalists accepted this conclusion. Ultimately, they urged, there can be nothing sinful in the character or action of a rational being. Imperfection or imperfect action there may be, because the whole power of God is not exerted. Yet every act, so far as it goes, is just what it should be, and is in harmony with God's will. This extreme optimism stood in sharp contrast with the teachings of Puritanism. But it was in full agreement with the expansive mood of the age.
Being intimately bound up with the concerns of the pulpit, Transcendefl.talism was less intent on theoretical consistency in its ideas than on making them a guide to conduct. Certain anticipations of Pragmatism therefore emerge in its pronouncements.~ This is particularly true of Emerson. In his famous address on "T~e American Scholar" he says: "The preamble of thought, the transition through which it passes from the unconscious to the consciou~, is action." 4 Elsewhere, he declares that the mind "melts knowledge into act." Sharply stated, this can only mean that ideas have their origin in practical activity, and also find their outlet in action. Such a linking of theory with practice was to become a central theme of the pragmatic school more than half a century later.
Transcendentalism proved to be, on the whole, a liberating creed. True, it contained a strong dash of Schwiirmerei and a predilection for mysticism which might have_ made it obscurantist. But this tendency was more than counterbalanced by its other elements, which combined to make it a -progressive in:flue~ce in American culture.
4Jbid., I, 94-5. .JI The academic world looked on all this with profound susptcron. Transcendentalism appeared to it as an unbalanced if not a dangerou! s doctrine.· The fact that certain members of the movement were outspoken in. condemnation of slavery, and that Parker, for example, had been indicted for obstructing the operation of the Fugitive Slave Law, seemed to confirm the subversive character of the new ideas. Even the aloof Emerson was ' person~ non grata at his own university of Harvard for a tjme b~cause of · his unorthodox views. ' The denominational colleges on the Atlantic seaboard during this period were highly conservative institutions. Their primary function of training recruits for the ministry obliged them to hold fast to tradition, and discourage adventures of ideas. It also required them to embrace a philosophy which wou~d be a bulwark against intellectual radicalism. They found the requisite point of view in· the Scottish philosophy of Common Sense. From the works of Thomas Reid, Dugald Stewart, and William Hamilton they obtained «an eminently safe philosophy which kept undergraduates locked in so many intellectual dormitories, secure from. the .dark. speculations of materiaiism and the beguiling allurements of idealism.'' 5 It likewise served as an antidote to scepticism, and to highflown speculation on :first and last things. The stronghold of the movement was· Princeton College. The chief spokesman w~s James McCoshJ President of Princeton, who expounded ((the· principles of comm~n sense, in several ponderous volumes. · As might be expectedJ both the presentation and the content of these principles were unspectacular. The Scottish philosophers had no nonsense about them. They restricted themselves to what could be established by factual observation and ca· utious inference. No subtle analyses interrupted the orderly march of their lo'gic; no dubieties disturbed the general atmosphere of assurance. Historically controversial points were dealt with by · appealing to "self-evident principles," or to the "intuit!ons of the mind.', Their use of the term "intuition" had little in · common with that of the Transcendentalists. McCosh was careful to explain that intuitions were ,. not to be confused with vague feelings or premonitions. There was nothing mysterious about them. They were simply the vehicles of direct and c·ertain knowledge.
6 Among the more important were the intuitions of the external world, of t.he uniformity of nature, of mathematical truths, of the self, find of moral values. The whole superstructure of knowledge res' ted on a foundation of indubitable propositions.
The Scottish philosophers defended a dualistic position in both episte- mology and metaphysics. Mind and matter were regarded as distinct and independent elements. -Matter,' as that which is extended and resistant, ·they held to be directly apprehended in knowledge. Things .are j,ust what they appear to be; though, of course, what · appears in 'a particular perception is only part of a more complex object. Truth consists in the conformity of ideas to things. The test of truth is unprejudiced observation of the facts 3 or valid inference therefro~. Mind as that which thinks, feels, and wills is directly apprehended as a unitary and enduring self. The universe is made up of a vast plurality of physical objects and events, t~gether , with a plurality of human minds. It exists in space and time, both of which are independent realities. In short 3 the world is precisely what common sense take.s it to be. A sound philosophy reaches the same general conclusions as does the plain man. The only difference is that it states these conclusions in a systematic and logical fashion.
This declaration gave assurance to those solid citizens faced with the problem of adjusting themselves to the ideas that were flowing into the country from Germany. As the writings of Kant began to be known, it was agreed that his philosophy could have significance only if it was translatable in terms of Common Sense. One writer remarked ,in the influential New Englander in 1857, that "some competent mind. should give us in the 1angu age of Reid and Ed wards, the en tire work of Kant, translating sentence _'by sentence, and chapter by chapter, as they occur in their order, with here and there such short footnotes as might be necessary." Only then could it be ascertained whether· Kant was "worth anything or not.'
17 .
From the standpoint of those administering the colleges, the Scottish philosophy had a number of merits. Its method encouraged students to think, but prevented them from thinking too much. Intuition prescribed the limits within which reasoning was necessary. The conclusions reached were in accord with the opinions of the respectable man in the street. · The presence· of dualism in the universe excus. ed one, from the labour of working out a un~fied system of thought. Above all, the Scottish .philosophy had t~e good sense to render unto theology the things that were theology's. It did n' ot try to compete with revealed religion. On the contrary, it offered an eminently suitable supplement to religious instruction. Finally, in a period when Jacksonian ~emocracy and the demand for extended suffrage .were challenging established political beliefs and practices, the Scottish p'hilosophy helped · the colleges to remain a stabilizing influence in the community.
During the final qua~ter of the century, the philosophy of Common Sense gradually disappeared as new winds of doctrine began to blow through college lecture halls. Yet its effects lingered on in American thought, andcan he detected .in such developments as ~eirce's "Critical Common- 
III
While the sober principles of Reid and Hamilton were being taught in the East, the philosophy of Hegel began to flourish in a corner of the Middle 'West. At first blush, it is hard to imagine a more unlikely spot for the ardent study of Hegel than St. Louis in the eighteen-sixties. Yet this turbulent front!er city, full of grandiose plans to become the nation's capital, illustrated some of the major Hegelian theses. It was a centre of ,continual change and movement, of the clash and reconciliation of opposing tendencies. It exhibited the uni_ty and homogeneity of ·a metropolis in the making, before social classes had clearly emerged. The majority of the population were European immigrants, a large number of whom had come from Germany. These people_ brought with them something of the in tel-· lectual atmosphere of their homeland, which for several decades had -been -dominated by the thought of Hegel.
'The founding of St. Louis Hegelianism was due to one of ~hese immigrants, I). C. Brokmeyer, in collaboration with a native-born American, Vil. T. Harris. Brokmeyer was the prophet of the movement. His powerful personality attracted followers, and his oracular interpretation of Hegel kept enthusiasm at a high pitch. Harris, a young Connecticut school-. master who migrated to St. Louis in 1857, was converted from Transcendentalism by Brokmeyer, and became the chief propagandist of the school. He assiduously expounded Hegei•s ideas in the 'Journal of Speculative Philosophy which he founded in 1867. This periodical, the first of its kind in· the country, played a vital role in providing a vehicle for the younger generation of philosophers. Continuing until 1893, it carried the maiden articles of Peirce, James, Royce, and · Dewey. At its inception, however, it was designed primarily to be the mouthpiece of Hegel in the New World.
The St. Louis group accepted Hegelianism almost without modification. They saw the universe through· the eyes of their master as the expression of Absolute Reason, whose dialectical laws obtain everywhere. Thus, the . ce?-seless activity of nature, the on-going processes of history, society, and culture, the growth of personality-all move through the three stages of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.
The cosmos is an arena of perpetual strife and reconciliation. Yet i.t is also ·a unity. The one is in the many and the many in the one. Underlying the apparent separateness of things there is continuity. Hence, personal experience is continuous with public institutions, thought is continuous with action, mind with nature, induction with deduction, and so on. Everything is connected with everything else in a single rational system;_ and only this system is fully real.
Unlike the Transcendentalists and the Scottish realists, ,the St. Louis Hegelians sought to show the limitations of individualism in social thinking. MetaphysicaHy, they con tended, the individual is less real than the comunity or nation of which he is a part. Indeed, it is through participation in the affairs of the community that he achieves full stature as a person.
So long as he merely pursues his own private' ends, he is dealing with that which is ephemeral and insignificant in the light of the whole. Individual--ism is an essential step in the development of national consciousness. But it must be aufgehoben if that consciousness is to come to fuli fruition. This . conclusion was related to another important trend of the times, the dawning sense of nationhood in America after the Civil War. St. Louis. was a very appropriate point of origin for the expression of this, since the city was almost in the centre of the continent and served as a link between East and vVest. Another phase of the St. Louis movement was its interest in social ·reform through education. This was a logical consequence of its acceptance of Hegelianism. For Hegel, the thought of unreflective persons was saturated with delusions of which they were unaware. The plain man, so far from possessing ultimate truth, lives in a realm of appearances. Only by moving away from the standpoint of common sense> and following the path of ratlonal thought, can he gain a comprehension ofthe real character of his world. Education of a philosophical kind is therefore essential to the development of his humanity. It is also essential to .the improvement of social conditions> for it shows him how to bring his institutions into accord -·with the ultimate nature of things. This educational task was the one to which Harris. increasingly devoted his energies. He became Superintendent of Schools in St. Louis, and later United States Commissioner of Education.
To the end of his life he remained convinced that the doctrines of Hegel were of great importance in providing enlightenment for the avera'ge citizen ai1d raising the level of his social life. But the nation was not in a frame of mind to be converted to Hegelian-. ism. Expanding industrialism continued to put a premium on individual .
enterprise and th~ principles of laissez-faire. · The · achievements of experiental science were turning men's minds away from metaphysical speculation to the· study of scientific method. The revolutionary implications of Darwinism were attracting universal attention. Consequently, 'when, in 1879> Harris accepted the invitation of Bronson Alcott to found a school of philosophy in Concord> the project was foredoomed to failure. Alcott apparently hoped that a transfusion from Hegel might revive moribund Transcendentalism. In any event, he believed that Hegel's dialectic would help to counteract the materialistic tendencies of current scientific thought. 8 However, the school lasted less than a decade. In its brief heyday, it offered a varied programme of courses, including lectures by· such notables as McCosh> Benjamin Peirce, James, and Fiske. But the philosophy of Hegel receded more and more into the backgroun.d.
It was not surprising that this philosophy-the greatest speculative synthesis of modern times-should leave its mark on American thought. Nor was it surprising that Hegel's ideas should be modified to suit native intellectual needs and interests. Peirce, Royce, and Dewey all provide illustrations in point. Peirce's metaphysical categories (Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness) and his espousal of an ccobjective logic,. have a decidedly Hegelian flavour. Indeed, he himself declares: HMy philosophy resuscitates Hegel, though in a strange costume." -Royce,s objective idealism, with its doctrine of the Absolute Will as the ultimate reality, is very close to Hegelianism. Dewey was at the start of his ·career an avow~d Hegelian. Although he soon deserted this position in favour of instrumentalism, man·y of his mature conceptions, such as the public character of experience, the continuity and interconnection of events, the importance of philosophy for education and social reform, reveal traces of his youthful association.
IV
The last, and perhaps the most influential, trend in philosophy during the century was produced by the arrival of evolutionary ideas in America. The controversy which resulted has been described as "the storm which broke the stagnant air and aroused many American minds from dogmatic torpor." 9 Discussion was precipitated on two levels, the scientific and the philosophical. Darwin's biological hypothesis was the subject-matter of debate in the former area; Spencer's evolutionary speculations> the subjectmatter in the latter. These two levels, although logically distinct, were · frequently confused in the heat of the argument.
The chief scientific figures involved were Asa Gray and Louis Agassiz. · Gray, the noted-Harvard botanist, wrote one of the first reviews of the Origin of Species, in which he warmly supported Darwin. The. review gave a brilliant ~ummary of the evidence for the mutability of species, and restated the case for the theory of natural selection through the struggle for surviv-al. The zoologist Agassiz, like his tea'cher Cuvier, remained a bitter opponent of evolutionary conceptions, and defended the notion of fixed biological species. He declared it far more likely that species had arisen through successive acts of creation than through a purely natural mode of development. His judgment here was undoubtedly influenced by his religious beliefs rather than by scientific e-Jidence. The extreme form of supernaturalism to which he adhered made the theory of evolution seem almost a blasphemy. He declared that he would outlive "this mania.'' . Yet when he died in 1873, practically all the scientists of the country agreed with Gray's estimate of Darwinism.
Among other defenders of the theory, Chauncey Wright deserves special mention. A man of clear and acute mind, Wright argued that Darwin's hypothesis belonged exclusively to biology, and had no religious~ philosophical, or social implications whatsoever. This position forced him to In short, Wright resisted all attempts to make the evolutionary hypothesis yield a philosophy, or to disprove e\rolution by , means of some philosophical dogma. As -a positivist, he. was convinced that science is metaphysically neutral. 10 But his was a voice crying in the wilderness. The age, was ripe for a "philosophy" of evolution, and the comprehensive system of Spencer was ready to hand. From 1870 until1890, Spencer enjoyed a far greater vogue in America than in his own country. By the end of the century more than 300,000 volumes of his work had been sold in the United States. -This popularity was due largely to the fact that the Synthetic Philosophy became the intellectual counterpart of major social trends of the day. Thus, people who were living in a competitive economy found it easy to believe that the struggle for -existence and the survival of the-fittest were grounded, as Spencer said, in the· very nature of the cosmos. His theory of progress made articulate the feelings . that accompanied the national expansion. Individualism received support from his politicn.l philosophy, which strongly -opposed stat_ e intervention in any ph-ase of social life. Peirce summed up' -the situation bluntly but forcibly when he remarked that the theory. of evolution met with such a favourable reception ''because of the encouragement it gave to the greed-philosophy." 11 In addition to his popUlar appeal, however, Spencer made a profound impression on the learned world. As a recent writer has said: "It was impossible to-be active in any field of intellectual work in the three decades after the Civil War without mastering Spencer." 12 Many of the younger philosophers whetted their wits on the Synthetic Philosophy by locating the flaws in its 'loosely-knit arguments. Particularly vigorous criticism came from those who were formulating the new P-ragmatic doctrines. They accepted the philosophical importance of Darwinism_, but disagreed with Spencer's interpretation of it. Peirce-, for exa,mple, attacked his nominalism, . his mech.anistic conception of development, an,d his failure to draw the full metaphysical consequences of evolution. In the highly speculative scheme that Peirce hi-mself favoured) not only the cosmps butnalso its laws were the products of evolutionary growth. James:, after a brief period a~ a Spencerian, expressed dissent in -a paper entitled "Remarks on Spencer's Definition of Mind as Correspondence.'' He there argued for a far more 1°F or an interesting discussion of this whole matter, see Philip P. Wiener's arti~le, "Chauncey Wright, Darwin and Scientific Neutrality" (Journal of the History of Ideas, vr,· 1945, .19-45) .
• 11 Col!ected Papers (Cambridge, Mass., 1932-5) , VI, 199. 12 R. Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought (Philadelphia, 1944), 20' . teleological view of mind th~n Spencer ·was willing ·to admit. The dry, pedantic style of the Synthetic Philosophy also exasperated him. He found little to admire in a mind "so fatally lacking in geniality, humour, pictur-. esqueness and poetry; and so explicit, so mechanical, so flat in the panorama which it gives to life.,ta .
The basic difference between Spencer and the Pragmatists arose out of their respective treatments of the ·individual's relation to his 'environment. Spencer regarded the environment · as something to which . the individual always adjusts himself. The whole lesson of evolution, he believed, was that the organism must come into harmony with its surroundings, or perish. Ideas .promote this adaptation by changing the internal responses of the person to the world. The Pragmatists, on the other hand, stressed the plasticity of the environment, and the power of man to mould it-so as to make it satisfy his needs. In this respect, human evolution is qualitatively di'fferent from purely · . organic evolution. Furthermore, ideas promo~e adaptation by. being instruments for changing ·the world, not passive reflections of it. History proved to be on the side of the latter interpretation. When the century drew to a close, Pragmatism had emerged as an influe~tial doctrine, whereas Spencer's star had set.
The passing of evolution from a controversial to a widely accepted theory, allowed some of its effects on American thought to be discerned. Broadly speaking, it did the following things. First, it caused philosophers to take time and change more seriously than they had done for . centuries.
The ancient G1·eek notion of becoming was restored to a central position in philosophy. Secondly, it· encouraged thinkers . to substitute dynamic concepts for static ones, especially in ontology. Substances were replaced by functions at numerous metaphysical points. Thus, the conception of , matter as a substratum that is fixed and unalterable, was challenged by the conception of it as a complex proc~ss. Similarly, the view of mind as a . permanent, spiritual enti'ty was challenged by the ·suggestion that it is · a developing function which can only be understood in terms of its origin. The bifurcation of human nature into a physical and a mental component, differing toto caelo, became less easy to defend in the presence of the hypothesis that both are activilies having a high degree of interdependence. Thirdly, evolution gave support to those philosophers who were seeking t~ link ideas with actions. The biological .doctrine that organic functions exist because of theit value in promoting survival, seemed to favour the conclusion that ideas, likewise, serve the purpose of helping the individual to live in his world. They must be ({guides to action." Finally, evolution gave new meaning to the contention that man is continuous with nature, by envisaging him as having "emerged" from more elementary natural forms. Emergent evolution made it possible to elaborate a naturalistic view of man without having recourse to the extremes of mechanism and determit;ism. These were the major consequences of D-arwinism which appeared as pmblems on the agenda of twentieth-century philosophy;
